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DOES LIBERAL EGALITARIANISM
DEPEND ON A THEOLOGY?
Paul Weithman

John Rawls’s argument for egalitarianism famously depends on his rejection
of desert. In The Theology of Liberalism, Eric Nelson contends that Rawls’s treatment of desert depends on anti-Pelagian commitments he first endorsed in his
undergraduate thesis and tacitly continued to hold. He also contends that a
broad range of liberal arguments for economic egalitarianism fail because they
rest on an incoherent conception of human agency. The failure becomes evident, Nelson says, when we see that proponents of those arguments unknowingly assume the anti-Pelagianism on which Rawls relied. Nelson concludes
that egalitarianism must be given a different political and theoretic basis than
Rawls and his followers have provided. I argue that Nelson misreads Rawls
and that egalitarians can avoid inconsistency without staking a theological
claim they want to avoid.

The unexpected publication of John Rawls’s undergraduate thesis a decade ago immediately led readers to look for continuities between the thesis
and Rawls’s mature work.1 The overtly theological character of the thesis,
entitled A Brief Inquiry into the Meaning of Sin and Faith,2 naturally raised a
question about what continuities there seemed to be: Did positions common to the earlier and later work depend upon religious premises that
were explicit in the thesis and that the later Rawls tacitly continued to
accept?3
In their introduction to Brief Inquiry, Joshua Cohen and Thomas Nagel
identified “a particularly striking continuity” between the thesis and A
Theory of Justice: “the rejection of merit.” In the thesis, Rawls followed
Augustine of Hippo in denying—against Augustine’s contemporary and
antagonist Pelagius—that human beings can merit salvation by their own
action. What might appear to be the bases of merit, such as the good that
1
Thanks to Eric Gregory, Jennifer Herdt, John McGreevy, Eric Nelson, Robert Goodin and
the editor and referees of Faith and Philosophy for helpful advice and comments on an earlier
draft.
2
Rawls, Brief Inquiry.
3
Berkowitz, “God and John Rawls.”
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we do and the virtues we develop, depend on the gift of fortunate circumstances. As Cohen and Nagel observe, these claims seem to anticipate Rawls’s later rejection of desert as the basis of distributive justice and
his arguments for the difference principle. Though the young Rawls says
that “[m]erit is a concept rooted in sin,”4 Cohen and Nagel say that Brief
Inquiry’s rejection of merit “can be given a purely secular significance.”5
But what they do not to say is that it “can be given a purely secular basis.”
And this is precisely what some readers of Rawls have doubted.6
These doubts have recently been given powerful expression by historian and political theorist Eric Nelson. In his The Theology of Liberalism,
Nelson contends that Theory’s rejection of desert and its argument for
the difference principle depend crucially upon Rawls’s tacit anti-Pelagianism.7 Nelson’s book is not just a provocative exercise in the history
of ideas. Given Rawls’s influence, the dependence of his argument on
suppressed religious premises would raise the question of whether the
egalitarian philosophies that have developed in his wake are similarly
dependent.
Nelson presses just that question, contending that a broad range of
liberal arguments for economic egalitarianism fail because they rest on
an incoherent conception of human agency. The failure becomes evident,
Nelson says, when we see that proponents of those arguments unknowingly assume the anti-Pelagianism Rawls staked out in his senior thesis
and never really abandoned. Nelson boldly concludes that egalitarianism—to which he himself seems sympathetic—must be given a different
political and theoretic basis than Rawls and his followers have provided.
Because the linchpin of Nelson’s book is his analysis of arguments for
the difference principle that Rawls advanced in A Theory of Justice, that
analysis will be my focus here. I begin with Nelson’s interpretation of the
relevant passage from Rawls. I will show why Nelson thinks that passage
and others from Theory support his claims about Rawls’s anti-Pelagianism
and about the inconsistency of Rawls’s egalitarian arguments. Part of
what makes Nelson’s analysis of interest is his claim about the source of
that inconsistency: Rawls’s allegedly asymmetric treatment of distributive
and retributive justice. I offer a reading of the passage in Theory that differs from Nelson’s and that suggests how Rawls can avoid inconsistency
without staking a theological claim he and other egalitarians would want
to avoid.
While my primary aim is to rebut Nelson’s sweeping critique of egalitarianism, the question of how to justify the asymmetric treatment of
distributive and retributive justice is of independent interest. Other philosophers have taken it up. I conclude by showing that my response to

4

Rawls, Brief Inquiry, 241.
Rawls, Brief Inquiry, 19.
6
Galston, “Driven Up the Rawls.”
7
Nelson, Theology of Liberalism.
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Nelson furnishes a necessary supplement to the deepest and most interesting of their answers.
1. The Egalitarian Argument
Nelson opens his chapter on Rawls by observing that “the central normative premise of recent Anglophone political theory [is] John Rawls’s idea
of ‘moral arbitrariness.’” He continues:
Rawls and his many disciples regard society as a cooperative scheme among
free and equal individuals, none of whom has any freestanding entitlement
to a larger share of the social product than any other. These theorists concede that some citizens are more productive than others, but they deny
that unusually productive members have a claim to the greater value that
they produce. The fact that some citizens are more productive than others
is dismissed as “arbitrary from a moral point of view,” on the grounds that
we cannot be said to deserve, or be responsible for, the features of our person that cause us to be better or worse at producing value. These features
include not only our degree of intelligence and our talents, but also (for
some) our level of industriousness and commitment. All of these facts about
us are regarded as “given” from outside, the products of some combination
of heredity and environment. Egalitarianism has thus come to depend, for
many of its proponents, upon the conviction that our actions and decisions
in the realm of production cannot be attributed to us in the morally relevant
sense; we cannot claim to have earned or merited the fruits of our labor,
from which it is taken to follow that these fruits should be distributed by the
‘basic structure of society’ in an egalitarian fashion.8

The argument Nelson ascribes to “Rawls and his many disciples” is not
easily extracted from this passage, but I believe he thinks it runs:
(1) Citizens can earn or merit the fruits of their labor only if their “actions
and decisions in the realm of production can be attributed to [them] in the
morally relevant sense.”
(2) “the features of our person that cause us to be better or worse at producing value,” including “not only our degree of intelligence and our talents, but also (for some) our level of industriousness and commitment” are
“‘given’ from the outside, the products of some combination of heredity and
environment.”
(3) “we cannot be said to deserve, or be responsible for, the features of our
person that cause us to be better or worse at producing value.”
(4) “The fact that some citizens are more productive than others”—and so
the “actions and decisions [undertaken] in the realm of production”—are
“‘arbitrary from a moral point of view.’”
(5) “our actions and decisions in the realm of production cannot be attributed to us in the morally relevant sense.”
8

Nelson, Theology of Liberalism, 49–50.
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(6) “we cannot claim to have earned or merited the fruits of our labor.”
C: “the fruits of our labor” “should be distributed by the ‘basic structure of
society’ in an egalitarian fashion.”

The third sentence of the passage says that (4) follows from (3), but the fact
that we do not deserve or are not responsible for our productive capacities does not obviously imply that their exercise is “arbitrary from a moral
point of view.” Here is a way to close the gap between (3) and (4) that
makes explicit steps which will prove important later.
(2) and (3) lead to:
(3.1) The features of persons that cause us to be better or worse at producing
value are given from the outside without regard to desert.

(3.1) together with
(3.2) If some features are given to us without regard to desert, then our possession of them is arbitrary from a moral point of view

supports:
(3.3) Our possession of the features that make us better or worse at producing value is arbitrary from a moral point of view.

(3.1) through (3.3) are not enough to close the gap between (3) and (4).
Closing it requires a link between our possession of productive capacities
and their exercise. That link can be provided by:
(3.4) If our possession of features is arbitrary from a moral point of view,
then so is our exercise of them.

(3.3) and (3.4) get us (4). To say the least, (3.4) is not obviously true. But
I shall suppose that this is the way Nelson would fill the gap between (3)
and (4), and so the way he thinks Rawls and other egalitarians defend
C. Call the resulting argument “the egalitarian argument” and C “the
egalitarian conclusion.”
Let’s understand classical anti-Pelagianism as the view that salvation
has to be granted to human beings without reference to desert because we
cannot do anything to deserve it, and we cannot do anything to deserve
it because of the effects of original sin on the will. The qualities and acts
that look like grounds of desert themselves depend upon grace we cannot earn. The conjunction of (2) and (3.1) seems to express a secularized
version of anti-Pelagianism, since it says that what look like grounds
of desert—now for economic rather than spiritual rewards—are really
“‘given’ from outside” without regard to desert. This version of anti-Pelagianism leads—via (3.2), (3.3) and (3.4)—to the claim about moral arbitrariness expressed in (4). That claim, Nelson says, is the “central normative
premise” in the egalitarian argument. So, with the egalitarian argument in
hand, we can see why Nelson thinks the later Rawls and other egalitarians
are tacit anti-Pelagians of a sort.
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Thinking that the Rawls of Theory derives his central premise from the
anti-Pelagianism of (2) and (3.1), Nelson says that the egalitarian argument of Rawls’s A Theory of Justice “essentially replicates” the anti-Pelagianism of his undergraduate thesis. Thinking that productive capacities are
given by what Rawls calls “the natural lottery,” Nelson says that the difference between the classical anti-Pelagianism of the young Rawls and the
version relied on Theory is that in the latter “grace has become chance.”9
From Princeton to Theory, Nelson avers, Rawls’s “essential anti-Pelagianism remained intact as a habit of mind.”10
So far, it is hard to see that Rawls’s argument for egalitarianism depends
upon a theological claim. For since chance has replaced grace in (2) and
(3.1), their conjunction expresses a claim that is reminiscent of theological
anti-Pelagianism but is not identical with it. In §4 we shall see why Nelson
thinks Rawls relies on anti-Pelagianism properly so-called, and why he
thinks the egalitarian argument fails as a consequence. But first, I want
to ask whether the egalitarian argument is rightly attributed to Rawls in
the first place. I shall contend that there are subtle but crucial differences
between that argument and the argument Rawls actually makes. Much of
the work involved in absolving Rawls of inconsistency consists in displaying his argument aright.
2. Rawls’s Argument for the Egalitarian Conclusion
Rawls refers to the “idea of ‘moral arbitrariness’” in a number of places
in A Theory of Justice. The argument Nelson attributes to Rawls seems to
follow one passage especially closely. To see whether the attribution is correct, it will be good to have that passage before us. The passage is from §12
of Theory, which concerns the form of Rawls’s second principle of justice
which will be considered in the original position.11 Some background is
required to make sense of the passage.
Rawls had previously stated his second principle in general terms:
social and economic inequalities are to be arranged so that they are both
(a) reasonably expected to be to everyone’s advantage, and (b) attached to
positions and offices open to all. (TJ, 53)

The phrases “everyone’s advantage” and “open to all” could mean many
things, so before presenting the principle to contracting parties, Rawls
makes them more precise. He notes that each phrase is open to two interpretations, giving rise to four possible interpretations of the principle,
which he displays in a 2x2 matrix (TJ, 57):
9

Nelson, Theology of Liberalism, 63.
Nelson, Theology of Liberalism, 53.
11
Rawls, Theory of Justice. References to this work will hereafter be given parenthetically
by “TJ” followed by the page number.
10
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Very roughly:
*A system of natural liberty is one in which there are no legal bars to citizens
competing for positions and offices, and in which the distribution of income
and wealth is determined by free, efficient markets.
*Liberal equality allows income and wealth to be distributed by free markets, but it puts measures in place to ensure that citizens can compete fairly
for offices and positions regardless of class of origin.
*Democratic equality conjoins liberal equality’s measures for insuring equality of opportunity with the requirement that economic inequalities be to the
maximum benefit of the least advantaged.

The passage whose argument Nelson paraphrases is one in which Rawls
argues that natural liberty and liberal equality are unjust—and so not
plausible candidates for choice in the original position—and that the democratic version of the second principle is the one the parties should consider. Rawls writes:
In the system of natural liberty. . .[t]he existing distribution of income and
wealth, say, is the cumulative effect of prior distributions of natural assets—
that is, natural talents and abilities—as these have been developed or left
unrealized, and their use favored or disfavored over time by social circumstances and such chance contingencies as accident and good fortune.
Intuitively, the most obvious injustice of the system of natural liberty is that
it permits distributive shares to be improperly influenced by these factors so
arbitrary from a moral point of view.
The liberal interpretation, as I shall refer to it, tries to correct for this by adding to the requirement of careers open to talents the further condition of the
principle of fair equality of opportunity. The thought here is that positions
are to be not only open in a formal sense, but that all should have a fair
chance to attain them. . .
While the liberal conception seems clearly preferable to the system of natural liberty, intuitively it still appears defective. For one thing, even if it works
to perfection in eliminating the influence of social contingencies, it still permits the distribution of wealth and income to be determined by the natural
distribution of abilities and talents. Within the limits allowed by the background arrangements, distributive shares are decided by the outcome of
the natural lottery; and this outcome is arbitrary from a moral perspective.
There is no more reason to permit the distribution of income and wealth to
be settled by the distribution of natural assets than by historical and social
fortune. Furthermore, the principle of fair opportunity can be only imperfectly carried out, at least as long as some form of the family exists. The
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extent to which natural capacities develop and reach fruition is affected by
all kinds of social conditions and class attitudes. Even the willingness to
make an effort, to try, and so to be deserving in the ordinary sense is itself
dependent upon happy family and social circumstances. It is impossible in
practice to secure equal chances of achievement and culture for those similarly endowed, and therefore we may want to adopt a principle which recognizes this fact and also mitigates the arbitrary effects of the natural lottery
itself. That the liberal conception fails to do this encourages one to look for
another interpretation of the two principles of justice. (TJ, 63-64)

This is a complicated passage, and I shall not go through every bit of it.
Instead, I shall ask whether it supports Nelson’s attribution of the egalitarian argument to Rawls.
The first step of the egalitarian argument is
(1) Citizens can earn or merit the fruits of their labor only if their “actions
and decisions in the realm of production can be attributed to [them] in the
morally relevant sense.”

Labor results in a contribution to the social product. But since people are
ordinarily remunerated in money rather than in kind, let’s take “the fruits
of their labor” to refer to the monetary equivalent of all or part of what
one contributes to the product. Then (1) says citizens can earn or merit
shares of income and wealth only if their “actions and decisions in the
realm of production can be attributed to [them] in the morally relevant
sense.” Though Rawls does not explicitly endorse (1), I shall grant that he
accepts it.
According to the second step of the egalitarian argument:
(2) “the features of our person that cause us to be better or worse at producing value,” including “not only our degree of intelligence and our talents, but also (for some) our level of industriousness and commitment” are
“‘given’ from the outside, the products of some combination of heredity and
environment.”

Rawls does not explicitly state (2) in the quoted passage, but he says:
(2)’ “The extent to which natural capacities develop and reach fruition is
affected by all kinds of social conditions and class attitudes. Even the willingness to make an effort, to try, and so to be deserving in the ordinary sense
is itself dependent upon happy family and social circumstances.”

Some of our natural capacities “cause us to be better or worse at producing
value” and some do not. But if we take our natural capacities to include
“features of our persons that cause us to be better or worse at producing
value,” then (2)’, seems to imply (2). I shall grant that Rawls accepts it.
What of (3)? It says:
(3) “we cannot be said to deserve, or be responsible for, the features of our
person that cause us to be better or worse at producing value.”
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The passage I quoted from §12 of Theory does not say anything about
deserving or being responsible for “the features of our person that cause
us to be better or worse at producing value” and so does not provide a textual basis for ascribing (3) to Rawls. But at page 87 of Theory, Rawls says
“[n]o one deserves his greater natural capacity nor merits a more favorable starting place in society.” This remark might be read as an opaque
endorsement of (3), and I believe Nelson takes it that way.12
The context of the passage from Theory, page 87 makes clear that the
phrase “natural capacity” refers specifically to what we might call “raw”
or “undeveloped capacity.” Moreover, Rawls says in the long-quoted passage that “the natural distribution of abilities and talents” is effected by
the natural lottery, and what is naturally distributed are undeveloped
talents. So, if the passage from page 87 is the basis for attributing (3) to
Rawls, the referent of (3)’s phrase “features of our person that cause us to
be better or worse at producing value” must be given by:
(3)’ No one deserves her place in the distributions of starting places, and of
raw or natural talents and abilities, which result from the natural lottery.

This, too, is a claim Rawls accepts. The problem with ascribing the egalitarian argument to Rawls lies in the way that argument moves from (3)’
via what Nelson calls “the central normative premise” (4) to the egalitarian conclusion.
Raw talents, natural abilities, and starting places make us more or less
productive. So (3)’ might be thought to support (4) via a step I already said
must be part of Nelson’s egalitarian argument:
(3.3) Our possession of the features that make us better or worse at producing value is arbitrary from a moral point of view.

But a careful reading of the long-quoted passage suggests that Rawls does
not accept (3.3). Instead, he accepts a claim that is subtly but importantly
different.
Consider the first paragraph of that passage, where Rawls says:
In the system of natural liberty. . .[t]he existing distribution of income and
wealth, say, is the cumulative effect of prior distributions of natural assets—
that is, natural talents and abilities—as these have been developed or left
unrealized, and their use favored or disfavored over time by social circumstances and such chance contingencies as accident and good fortune.
Intuitively, the most obvious injustice of the system of natural liberty is that
it permits distributive shares to be improperly influenced by these factors so
arbitrary from a moral point of view.

At first blush, the phrase “factors so arbitrary from a moral point of view”
might be thought to refer to “our natural talents and abilities—as these
have been developed.” If our developed talents and abilities are “the features that make us better or worse at producing value,” then this reading
12

Nelson, Theology of Liberalism, 62–63.
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of the passage would support the ascription of (3.3) to Rawls. But, in fact,
what “factors so arbitrary from a moral point of view” refers to is the
“prior distribution” of natural or raw talents and abilities, together with
the circumstances and contingencies that favor or disfavor their development. By the “prior distribution” I take Rawls to mean “the shape of the
distribution curve”—or, more precisely, the relative frequency of various
raw talents in the population. So what is morally arbitrary is not, as (3.3)
asserts, our mere possession of the “features that make us better or worse
at producing value.” It is the scarcity or prevalence of those features, which
in turn helps to account for the market value of what is produced by their
exercise.
And so Rawls does not accept either (3.3) or
(4) “The fact that some citizens are more productive than others”—and so
the “actions and decisions [undertaken] in the realm of production”—are
“‘arbitrary from a moral point of view.’”

Rather, what he accepts is
(4)’ The distribution of natural talents and abilities, and the social circumstances and chance contingencies that affect their development, are arbitrary
from a moral point of view.

The fact that this version of the fourth step is supported—without implausible intervening claims—by (3)’, which is the version of the third step
Rawls accepts, lends this reading some credence.
So far, the difference between my reading and Nelson’s may seem
inconsequential. But now note that unlike (4), (4)’ does not support
(5) “our actions and decisions in the realm of production cannot be attributed to us in the morally relevant sense.”

To see the consequences of this difference, we need to see how Rawls
moves from (4)’ to the egalitarian conclusion.
The long-quoted passage concerns various distributive systems.
I believe that at this point in his argument, Rawls makes an assumption about such systems. To test this exegetical hypothesis, suppose that
instead of (5), he assumes:
(5)’ If a distributive system does not identify and nullify the effects of morally arbitrary conditions on the development and exercise of our productive
capacities, then under that system “our actions and decisions in the realm of
production cannot be attributed to us in the morally relevant sense.”

What does “attributed to us in the morally relevant sense” mean? If (1)
and (5)’ are to get Rawls to the sixth step of the egalitarian argument, then
what attribution must be morally relevant to is the earning or meriting
referred to in (1). It is because the fruits of our labor are not earned or
merited, as the sixth step says, that justice requires the fruits of everyone’s
labor to be distributed in an egalitarian way. So I take it that if the fruits
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of labor were “earned or merited,” the fact that they were would put prior
moral constraints on how the system can distribute income and wealth.
Call the claims of earning or merit that would impose such prior constraints “desert claims.” Then what (5)’ must really mean is:
(5)’’ If a distributive system does not identify and nullify the effects of morally arbitrary conditions on the development and exercise of our productive
capacities, then under that system “our actions and decisions in the realm of
production” do not give rise to desert claims to shares of income and wealth.

On this reading, what (6) really means is:
(6)’ We cannot acquire desert claims to shares of income and wealth.

My own view is that (5)’’ is highly plausible. More important for present
purposes, it leads to a highly plausible reading of Rawls’s argument. For if
(5)’ means (5)’’, then the conjunction of (4)’, (5)’’, (1), and claims about the
failure of various systems of distribution to nullify the effects of morally
arbitrary factors would enable Rawls to infer an instance of (6)’ for each
such distributive scheme. Now suppose that Rawls also assumes:
(7) A system of distribution is unjust if the distribution of undeserved shares
of income and wealth does not benefit the worst off.

Then if a distributive system for which there is an instance of (6)’ also
satisfies the “if” clause of (7), it is unjust. And, so, with instances of (6)’
in hand, and with the supposition of (7) in place, Rawls can use (1), (2)’,
(3)’ and (4)’ to eliminate distributive systems as unjust one-by-one. That is
exactly how he proceeds.13
3. Eliminating the Alternatives
Recall that Nelson finds the egalitarian argument in a passage in which
Rawls argues by process of elimination that democratic equality is the
version of his second principle that should be presented to parties in the
original position. Rawls’s argument proceeds in stages.
The first stage eliminates natural liberty. Natural liberty, Rawls says,
allows distribution to be “determined” by those factors which (3)’ says are
distributed by the natural lottery and which (4)’ therefore says are “arbitrary from a moral point of view.” He then says, “the most obvious injustice of the system of natural liberty is that it permits distributive shares to
be improperly influenced by these factors so arbitrary from a moral point
of view.” He eliminates natural liberty on the grounds of this injustice. But
what is improper influence? And why is it unjust for natural liberty to permit distributive shares to be “improperly influenced” by morally arbitrary
13
(7) is a strong and controversial claim. But to absolve Rawls of the inconsistency of
which Nelson accuses him, I do not need to show that every step in the argument I attribute
to Rawls is right. I need only to show that the attribution is right, and that it does not lead
to any inconsistency.

DOES LIBERAL EGALITARIANISM DEPEND ON A THEOLOGY?

273

factors? If we understand Rawls’s argument as I have proposed, we can
answer those questions.
Natural liberty allows distributive shares to be influenced by morally arbitrary factors because it does not identify and nullify them. That,
together with (5)’’ and (1), imply an instance of (6)’ which is true of natural
liberty, namely:
(6NL)’ Under natural liberty, “we cannot claim to have earned or merited the
fruits of our labor.”

So, if natural liberty gives rise to inequalities, those who benefit from them
will not have earned or merited their income and wealth. What makes
natural liberty’s failure to identify and nullify the influence of arbitrary
factors improper is that these unearned shares are not distributed so as to
generate benefits for the worst off. (7) then gets us to Rawls’s conclusion:
that natural liberty can be eliminated as unjust.
The second stage of Rawls’s argument eliminates liberal equality.
Liberal equality departs from natural liberty by replacing the principle
of “careers open to talents” with “fair equality of opportunity.” What the
latter requires is “those who are at the same level of talent and ability, and
have the same willingness to use them, should have the same prospects of
success regardless of their initial place in the social system.” (TJ, 63)
Rawls’s argument against liberal equality is that it inherits the injustice
of natural liberty because measures to implement fair equality of opportunity fail to nullify the effects of the morally arbitrary factors referred
to in (5)’’. Fair equality of opportunity could not correct for those effects
“even if it work[ed] to perfection in eliminating the influence of social contingencies” because it would still allow distribution to be affected by the
distribution of natural talents. The distribution of these talents is morally
arbitrary. Moreover, Rawls hastens to add, “the principle of fair opportunity can be only imperfectly carried out.”
The reason it can be only imperfectly carried out is given by a claim we
have already seen:
(2)’ The extent to which natural capacities develop and reach fruition is
affected by all kinds of social conditions and class attitudes. Even the willingness to make an effort, to try, and so to be deserving in the ordinary sense
is itself dependent upon happy family and social circumstances.

And so Rawls thinks that no system of rules regulating the availability of
opportunities can ensure that inequalities of income and wealth will not
be due to the factors (4)’ says are arbitrary from a moral point of view.
It follows from (5)’’ that there is an instance of (6)’ that applies to liberal
equality as there was to natural liberty. And since Rawls thinks that the
distributions allowed by liberal equality, like those allowed by natural
liberty, fail to generate compensating benefits for the least advantaged,
liberal equality can also be eliminated.
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That leaves democratic equality. It is sometimes alleged that Rawls
accepts democratic equality because it, unlike natural liberty and liberal
equality, does nullify the effects of the natural lottery.14 But this is a mistake.
Because democratic equality includes fair equality of opportunity, and
because fair equality of opportunity can only be imperfectly carried out,
there is a version of (6)’ that applies to it as there was to natural liberty and
liberal equality. The fact that there are versions of (6)’ which apply to all
distributive systems explains why Rawls’s account of distributive justice
dispenses with desert altogether. But the injustice of natural liberty and
liberal equality is not passed on to democratic equality because, by substituting the difference principle for the principle of efficiency, democratic
equality does generate compensating benefits for the least advantaged.
That is why Rawls implies, at the end of the quoted passage, that democratic equality “mitigates” rather than eliminates “the arbitrary effects of
the natural lottery.”
In sum: I do not believe that Rawls is correctly read as endorsing
Nelson’s egalitarian argument. Nelson is correct that a moral arbitrariness
claim is “the central normative premise” of the Rawlsian argument for
egalitarianism. But on my reading, that claim is (4)’ rather than (4)—it is
a claim which ascribes moral arbitrariness, not to the features of persons,
but to the distribution of raw talents and the conditions under which they
are developed. Moreover, my reading takes as crucial to the argument a
fact that Nelson ignores: the fact that systems of distributive rules do not
identify and nullify the influence of those conditions. This fact will prove
important in absolving Rawls of the incoherence Nelson finds in his view.
To see why, we need to see what that incoherence is said to be.
4. Two Views of Human Agency?
Though I disagree with Nelson about how the “central normative premise” of Rawls’s egalitarian argument is to be understood, Nelson could
make the point he wants to make about the later Rawls’s anti-Pelagianism
even if I am right. For what really matters for his critique is that Rawls and
other egalitarians accept
(6)’ We cannot acquire desert claims to shares of income and wealth.

To see the significance of this step, note that because (6)’ leads to the injustice of natural liberty and liberal equality, it seems to impose a significant
limit on what human beings can do: we cannot acquire desert claims in
distributive shares. And so, Nelson thinks, Rawls—and egalitarians who
follow him—seem to accept a limited view of human agency. Moreover,
Nelson would add, the limitation on agency that follows from (6)’ is not
just significant, it is in tension with something Rawls seems to imply elsewhere in A Theory of Justice.
14

Gorr, “Rawls on Natural Inequality.”
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Rawls briefly discusses retributive justice in section 48 of Theory. There
he says that
It would be far better if the acts proscribed by penal statutes were never
done. Thus a propensity to commit such acts is a mark of bad character, and
in a just society legal punishments will only fall upon those who display
these faults. (TJ, 277)

Undeserved punishment would seem to be an injustice. So if a just society
would punish criminals, that must be because the criminals deserve it. If
that is right, then Rawls’s remark shows that he does not accept what we
might call the “retributive analogue” of (6)’:
(6R)’ We cannot come to deserve punishment by performing “acts proscribed
by penal statutes.”

But if Rawls does not accept (6R)’ while accepting (6)’, then he seems to
allow that citizens can come to deserve punishment for stealing money
that is not theirs but cannot come to deserve money—and so make it
theirs—by working for it. More generally, Nelson would say, by not
accepting (6R)’ while accepting (6)’, Rawls treats distributive and retributive justice asymmetrically. To see the asymmetry more clearly, and to see
what problems Nelson thinks the asymmetry causes, it will help to see its
source in Rawls’s thought.
We have already seen that Rawls thinks (6) depends upon (2)’. But if he
accepts (2)’, then it seems that he should also accept:
(2R)’ The extent to which a sense of justice develops and reaches fruition is
affected by all kinds of social conditions and class attitudes. Even the willingness to make an effort, to try to preserve and act on one’s sense of justice,
and so to refrain from “acts proscribed by penal statutes” is itself dependent
upon happy family and social circumstances.

If (2)’ leads Rawls to (6)’, then (2 R)’ ought to lead him to (6R)’. Conversely,
since Rawls does not accept (6R)’, he ought not to accept (2 R)’. But not only
is (2 R)’ highly plausible, but Rawls seems to endorse it in some form in
his discussion of how citizens of a well-ordered society develop a sense of
justice. For after laying out the conditions of familial love that encourage
moral development, Rawls adds “[p]resumably moral development fails
to take place to the extent that these conditions are absent” (TJ, 408). Rawls
therefore accepts both (2)’ and (2 R)’. It is Rawls’s acceptance of (2)’ and
(2 R)’ that leads Nelson to say that Rawls’s view of human agency can be
absolved of incoherence only on the supposition that Rawls’s “essential
anti-Pelagianism remained intact as a habit of mind” when he wrote A
Theory of Justice. What is the incoherence? And how does an anti-Pelagian
supposition about original sin absolve Rawls of it?
(6)’ supports Rawls’s claim that our exercise of initiative does not allow
us to acquire desert claims that a distributive system must accommodate.
It therefore leads to a significant limitation on our ability to alter our own
moral status. The refusal to accept (6R)’ is what allows Rawls to claim
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that criminal behavior requires or permits that we be punished—hence
requires or permits that we be subjected to treatment that would otherwise be wrong. By refusing to accept (6R)’, Rawls seems to imply that our
ability to alter our own moral status is robust. Though Nelson does not
put it this way, the incoherence in Rawls’s view of human agency consists
in his ascribing to the human will these seemingly contradictory powers.
How to explain the fact that our acts of will can make us liable to punishment but cannot give us claim-rights to benefits? One explanation is
that our will is wounded or deformed, so that we cannot but do the sorts
of things that make punishment—even eternal punishment—a permissible response, but that our will is too weak to do what we would have to
do to acquire claim-rights to benefits—and certainly too weak to acquire
claim-rights to eternal felicity. This explanation is the anti-Pelagian view
of original sin. While it is not the only explanation on offer in the literature, Nelson thinks it is the best one.
“The point,” Nelson says,
is not that the mature Rawls continued to accept the doctrine of original sin,
but rather that he continued to write and think as if he did. And to the extent
that his many disciples have tended to regard human responsibility as quite
robust in the retributive realm and highly attenuated in the distributive
realm, they are likewise operating under the shadow of a theological claim.15

If the later Rawls and “his many disciples” want to move out from under
that shadow—if they want explicitly to disavow the anti-Pelagianism that
makes sense of their view—then they cannot hold (2)’, (6)’ and (2 R)’ while
refusing to accept (6R)’. If (2 R)’ is too plausible to give up, and if—as they
think—(2)’ supports (6)’, then they must give up both (2)’ and (6)’. But
(2)’ and (6)’ are needed to support Rawls’s argument for the egalitarian
conclusion C. Without those steps, the argument for that conclusion collapses. Thus, Nelson would say, contemporary egalitarians are stuck with
an incoherent account of human agency that undermines their position.
The challenge, then, is to provide an alternative and superior explanation
of Rawls’s acceptance of (2)’, (2R)’ and (6)’, and his refusal to accept (6R)’. In
the next two sections, I shall argue that that challenge can be met.
5. Resolving the Tension: Distribution
I have said that Rawls endorses what we might call “system-specific” versions of (6). That is, he endorses a version of (6)’ for natural liberty, a version for liberal equality, and a version for democratic equality. We have
seen that the arguments against natural liberty and liberal equality move
from (2)’, (3)’ and (4)’ to the relevant version of (6)’ via:
(5)’’ If a distributive system does not identify and nullify the effects of morally arbitrary conditions on the development and exercise of our productive

15

Nelson, Theology of Liberalism, 69 (original emphasis).
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capacities, then under that system “our actions and decisions in the realm of
production” do not give rise to desert claims to shares of income and wealth.

plus, for any distributive system, the claim that that system satisfies the
“if” clause of (5)’’. So it will be because a given system of rules fails to
identify and nullify morally arbitrary conditions that our actions will not
be attributable to us in the relevant sense. Thus, the truth of the relevant
version of (6)’ depends upon the failure of a particular system of rules.
I have supposed that Rawls accepts (2R)’. In order to treat distributive
and retributive justice symmetrically, Rawls would have to move from
(2R)’ to (6R) via (3)’, (4)’ and:
(5R)’’ If a retributive system does not identify and nullify the effects of morally arbitrary conditions on the development and exercise of our sense of
justice, then under that system we cannot come to deserve punishment by
performing “acts proscribed by penal statutes.”

plus a premise to the effect that the retributive system in question satisfies the “if” clause of (5R)’’. Conversely, if the premise about retributive
rules is false—if there is a retributive system that does identify and nullify
the effects of morally arbitrary conditions on our sense of justice—then
Rawls could not move from (5R)’’ to (6R)’. In that case, the argument for
(6R)’ would not go through and we could understand why Rawls does
not accept it. We could explain Rawls’s asymmetrical treatment of distribution and retribution without appeal to anti-Pelagianism. That is what
I propose to do.
To begin, note that (2)’ itself is not in question. What is in question is
how Rawls can accept (2)’ and (6)’, while not accepting (6R)’. So, we can
suppose it is true that:
(2)’ “The extent to which natural capacities develop and reach fruition is
affected by all kinds of social conditions and class attitudes. Even the willingness to make an effort, to try, and so to be deserving in the ordinary sense
is itself dependent upon happy family and social circumstances.”

As we have seen, Rawls claims that none of the systems of distributive
rules that he considers—natural liberty, liberal equality, democratic equality—identifies and nullifies the distributive effects of the morally arbitrary
conditions (2)’ identifies. What recommends democratic equality is that it
requires the distributions that result from those conditions to work for the
least advantaged. But Rawls does not claim that it is impossible to identify and nullify the effects of the conditions,16 nor need he claim that the
distributive effects of factors which are not morally arbitrary are so small
as to be unworthy of notice.
Economists who study early childhood education claim to have made
considerable progress in identifying social and familial conditions which
16

As Nelson observes; see 64.
For just one example, see Chetty, et al., “How Does Your Kindergarten Classroom Affect
Your Earnings?”
17
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are correlated with success later in life.17 Suppose—and I shall return to
this supposition in the concluding section—that researchers succeed in
identifying more of these factors and are eventually able to isolate the
contributions that those conditions make. Indeed, suppose that it is eventually possible to isolate, and perhaps even to quantify, that portion of
someone’s success which is due to those factors and which “can be attributed to [her] in the morally relevant sense.” Mightn’t it then be possible to
frame and institute an alternative to the distributive systems Rawls considers, one which does reward people for what can be attributed to them in
the relevant sense? And what would such a system be like?
I cannot consider all imaginable systems of rules. Instead, I shall consider one that I believe is appealing to opponents of philosophical egalitarianism: a system that rewards each person for that part of her contribution
to the social product which can be attributed to her in the relevant sense
and so gives her what she deserves.
It is hard to know exactly what such a distributive system would look
like, but here is one possibility. Assume the existence of efficient markets
constrained by Rawls’s equal liberty principle. Assume further that the
market wage for each occupation equals the value of the marginal product
of someone who practices it. So the market wage for a plumber equals the
value of a plumber’s contributions to the social product. The same will
be true for carpenters, front-line workers, and heart surgeons. Allow the
gross pay of members of each occupation to be what they can command
on the labor market. Each person’s gross pay might then be thought equal
to the value of her contribution to the social product.
Now adjust gross pay so each person’s net pay reflects that percentage
of her contribution which is attributable to her. Thus, if the value of Jan’s
contribution as a plumber—ascertained by her marginal contribution to
the social product—is $50,000 and her real contribution is 75%, then Jan’s
income should be, or be based on, $37,500. That is what she deserves. If
Nan’s contribution as a carpenter—again ascertained by her marginal
product—is $72,000, and her real contribution is 75%, then Nan’s income
should be, or be based on, $54,000. The resulting system of distributive
rules is sensitive to information about the morally arbitrary factors identified in (2)’. It uses the information to identify the effects of those factors
and to nullify their influence on distribution.18
This scheme assumes that each member of each occupation makes contributions of the same value, a value equal to that person’s hourly wage.
But labor markets are notoriously beset by asymmetries of information.
Some surgeons are better than others, as some plumbers are better than
others. The fact that all can command the same pay for the same service may reflect buyers’ ignorance of the difference in quality of service
18
Luck egalitarians want any inequalities in individuals’ holdings to result from choice
rather than luck. They therefore try to nullify all effects of moral arbitrariness. The system
described here is therefore not luck egalitarian. Taking its cue from Nelson’s reference to
production, it aims to nullify just the effects of moral arbitrariness on what people produce.
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rather than the fact that all make contributions of the same value. And so
a system which insures that the net pay of each is based on the portion of
her contribution attributable to her would need more information about
individual contributions than labor markets provide. Gross pay would
have to be adjusted in light of that information, in addition to information about the effects of morally arbitrary conditions. But I shall leave this
complication aside.
The system would require full information about every person’s native
abilities, social and familial circumstances, and the effects of these on her
psychological propensities. Such information could be acquired only at
the cost of considerable intrusiveness into private lives. The intrusion
would be on-going since information about individuals would have to be
updated regularly as their conditions change. Information which is self-reported would have to be verified. Verification would itself be intrusive. We
generally think the information the system would require is protected by
privacy rights. That the system requires information which we think protected presses important questions about desert-based views. Is it plausible to suppose that distributive justice limits privacy rights so severely or
that someone waives those rights by entering the labor market?
The system also requires those who administer the system to make
judgments of desert based on the information they gather. The judgment
that someone deserves a high percentage of her gross pay because she
has overcome deficits of natural talent, family circumstances that are correlated with lack of success, or both is bound to be received as degrading
by workers and their families. Someone who is judged to deserve a low
percentage is bound to feel that his own initiative has been insulted. Does
distributive justice really require subjecting people to moral judgments
that will be so received?
It may be responded that, unfortunately, distributive rules that honor
desert claims do require information that can only be acquired intrusively
and applied judgmentally. But this response depends upon the coherence
of desert-based views. The appealing intuition behind the system now
under consideration is that people deserve income shares which depend
upon the value of what they actually contribute. That means we need
more information than efficient markets provide if we are to distinguish
actual from apparent contributions.
The problem with such a system is that it is not just “actions and decisions in the realm of production” that are affected by morally arbitrary
factors. Actions and decisions in the realm of consumption can be as well.
Differences in consumer demand for plumbers and carpenters may result
from the morally arbitrary fact that homeowners would rather repair their
own faucets than their own woodwork. These differences in the consumption of plumbing and carpentry services could account for differences in
the marginal product of plumbers and carpenters, and so can yield differences in the bases on which the deserved income of plumbers and carpenters is to be computed. The same is true of differences in consumer
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interest in baseball and rock-climbing, which account for the vast differences between the earnings of major league baseball players and comparably accomplished professional rock-climbers. Without further adjusting
for these contingencies, desert-adjusted wages will still be influenced by
factors which are arbitrary from a moral point of view.
More generally: there are many different ways the economy might be,
and differences among them are often morally arbitrary. If we are troubled
by the effects of moral arbitrariness on distributive shares, we should not
just be troubled by its effects on differences between marginal product
and deserved pay in the economy we happen to have. We ought also to be
disturbed by the fact that features of the economy we happen to have—
what roles exist and which roles attract what gross rewards—depend
upon a host of factors which are every bit as arbitrary from a moral point
of view as the factors singled out in (2)’. Consistency demands that those
who think distributive systems should be sensitive to desert identify and
nullify those factors as well.
It is not at all clear what information about alternative possibilities
would have to be acquired to do that or how such information could be
acquired. If Jan’s gross earnings as a plumber in our economy are $50,000,
what do we need to know about the other roles she might occupy and the
other incomes she might enjoy to determine what she deserves and how
could we possibly learn it?
What seems certain is that information about alternative possibilities
could not be acquired in the sort of publicly acceptable ways that are
needed to justify distributive rules. It may be said that people deserve
what they would earn under a just distributive scheme. But if there can
be a plurality of just schemes the differences among which are morally
arbitrary, then the influence of morally arbitrary factors on distribution
will not have been eliminated. Nor will this response help those who think
that desert claims constrain what form distributive schemes must take if
they are to be just, since it puts justice prior to desert.
It thus seems that a consistent version of the distributive rules I said
anti-egalitarians have in mind requires that the intrusive and the judgmental be supplemented by the unobtainable. So we can see why Rawls
accepts (2)’ and why he would think that the distributive system I have
been considering satisfies the “if” clause of
(5)’’ If a distributive system does not identify and nullify the effects of morally arbitrary conditions on the development and exercise of our productive
capacities, then under that system “our actions and decisions in the realm of
production” do not give rise to desert claims to shares of income and wealth.

We can therefore see why he would accept the version of
(6)’ We cannot acquire desert claims to shares of income and wealth.
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that applies to that system. I have said that Rawls accepts the retributive
analogue of (2)’, so why doesn’t he accept the retributive analogy of (6)’
by parity of reasoning?
6. Resolving the Tension: Retribution
Recall that the retributive analogue of (2)’ is:
(2 R)’ The extent to which a sense of justice develops and reaches fruition is
affected by all kinds of social conditions and class attitudes. Even the willingness to make an effort, to try to preserve and act on one’s sense of justice,
and so to refrain from “acts proscribed by penal statutes” is itself dependent
upon happy family and social circumstances.

The retributive analogue of (6)’ is:
(6R)’ We cannot come to deserve punishment by performing “acts proscribed
by penal statutes.”

Systems of retributive justice typically do two things. They issue judicial
condemnations or expressions of blame in the form of public convictions
for crimes. They also impose hard treatment in the form of probation,
fines, or imprisonment. These two are logically separable. It is questionable whether criminals deserve hard treatment19 and we should not read
Rawls as implying that they do. It is, however, highly plausible that criminals deserve condemnation. I shall therefore understand ‘punishment’ in
(6R)’ to refer to judicial expressions of blame, and to their consequences for
the criminal’s reputation. The intuition that criminals deserve punishment
in this sense is one Rawls wants to preserve. The question is whether he
can do that, consistent with rejecting (6)’.
The argument from (2)’ via (5)’’ to (6)’ depends upon two claims. One is
that distributive rules could nullify the effects of morally arbitrary factors
only if they were sensitive to information which it would be objectionably
intrusive to gather and objectionably degrading to rely upon. The other
is that the goal which would have justified gathering and relying upon
such information—namely, recognizing the desert-claims people acquire
in virtue of their actual contributions to systems of cooperation—cannot
be made out because of the ineliminable moral arbitrariness of what such
systems reward. The symmetrical treatment of distributive and retributive
justice would require Rawls to move from (2 R)’ to (6R)’ in the same way. But
neither of the two claims has an analogue that holds of retributive rules.
It is true that if a system of retributive justice is to nullify the effects
of family and social circumstances on a criminal’s behavior to determine
what can properly be attributed to her, the system will have to gather a
19
Scanlon, “Giving desert its due,” 103; see also Garcia, “Two Concepts of Desert,”
224–232.
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great deal of information about her background and family. As in the distributive case so in the retributive one, I shall assume for the sake of argument that such information is available. Gathering it may be intrusive, but
it is desirable that a system of retributive justice be administered in light
of such information about the criminals precisely so as to ascertain for
what conduct the accused is actually responsible. In this way, retributive
systems are very different from labor markets, which should not be—and
probably cannot be—designed to provide extensive information about
those who participate in them.
The reason it is desirable that retributive rules be administered in light of
extensive information is that the point of such rules is to punish people for
the violations of penal statutes for which they are actually responsible. We
saw that what behavior labor markets reward is shot through with moral
arbitrariness because of the moral arbitrariness of consumption decisions.
The arbitrariness of what markets reward undermines what was said to
be the point of systems that would reward people as they deserve. But as
Rawls observes “the purpose of the criminal law is to uphold basic natural
duties, those which forbid us to injure other persons in their life and limb,
or to deprive them of their liberty and property, and punishments are to
serve this end.” (TJ, 276). The natural duties—and hence society’s decisions about what to punish—are not morally arbitrary. And, so, there is no
arbitrariness to what systems of retributive justice condemn that is comparable to the moral arbitrariness of what distributive systems reward.
In contrast to systems of distributive rules, then, systems of retributive
rules have a coherent point which would be advanced by the use of extensive—if possible, full—information. Because they do, and because I have
assumed for the sake of argument that such information is available, there
can be retributive systems which do not satisfy the “if” clause of:
(5R)’’ If a retributive system does not identify and nullify the effects of morally arbitrary conditions on the development and exercise of our sense of
justice, then under that system we cannot come to deserve punishment by
performing “acts proscribed by penal statutes.”

But if a system does not satisfy the “if” clause, then even though Rawls
accepts (2 R)’, he cannot get from there to:
(6R)’ We cannot come to deserve punishment by performing “acts proscribed
by penal statutes.”

This shows how Rawls can consistently accept (2)’, (6)’, and (2 R)’ without
accepting (6R). It therefore shows why he treats distributive and retributive justice asymmetrically.
7. Conclusion
In laying out my reading of Rawls, I supposed that there are facts about
individuals’ contributions to their own productive efforts that can be distinguished from facts about moral contingencies and their effects on those
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efforts. That may seem a dubious supposition. It may also seem an unnecessary one. Mine is not the only attempt in the philosophical literature to
address the asymmetry which Nelson thinks is the source of the tension.
Samuel Scheffler, who has argued for a deep and interesting difference
between distributive and retributive justice that would justify Rawls’s
asymmetric treatments, seems not to rely on it. To see what is gained by
making the supposition, let us turn briefly to Scheffler’s argument.
Scheffler contends that while distributive and retributive justice are
both kinds of justice, there is a significant difference between them.
Distributive justice under modern conditions is, Scheffler argues, “holistic in the sense that the justice of any assignment of economic benefits
to a particular individual always depends—directly or indirectly—on the
justice of the larger distribution of benefits in society.”20 Retributive justice, by contrast, is individualistic. It responds to facts about individuals
and what they have done. This difference, which Scheffler thinks Rawls
recognizes, is said to justify the asymmetric treatment of distributive and
retributive justice.
Scheffler’s case for holism depends upon both moral and empirical
claims, including claims about our equal moral status and the claims
about dependency and contingency to which I appealed in §5. In light of
these claims, Scheffler says,
[t]he holist concludes that it makes no normative sense to suppose that there
could be, at the level of fundamental principle, a standard for assigning such
benefits that appealed solely to characteristics of or facts about the proposed
beneficiaries. Yet that is precisely what a prejusticial conception of desert
would have to be.21

One reason it might not make sense to suppose that there could be a standard of the sort to which Scheffler refers would be that there are no facts
about the proposed beneficiaries—such as facts about the contributions
individuals make to their own productive efforts—to which such standards could appeal. But I do not take Scheffler to be saying that. What he
says is compatible with acknowledging, denying, or remaining agnostic
about whether there are such facts. And Scheffler does not say that it makes
no sense to suppose there could be the kind of standard merit-based views
require. He says that “it makes no normative sense.” By this, I take him to
mean that even if there were facts about individuals’ contributions, they
could not bear the normative weight that merit-based views put on them.
That is, they could not ground desert-claims which constrain principles
of distributive justice. When Scheffler says that “it makes no normative
sense,” he is staking a strong claim—one which goes beyond the assertion that it is a mistake to put so much weight on facts about individuals.
Perhaps what he has in mind is something like this: our dependence on
others is so extensive and obvious, and the value of equality so obviously
20
21

Scheffler, “Justice and Desert,” 190 (original emphasis).
Scheffler, “Justice and Desert,” 191.
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weighty, that it is clear any fundamental distributive principle would
have to appeal to them and not just to facts about individuals. Indeed, the
holist may think, it is so utterly clear that to maintain the contrary is to fly
in the face of reason.
But the anti-holist will no doubt disagree. She will think that if there
are facts of the relevant sort about individuals, and those facts can be discovered, then they can ground desert-claims. The holist needs a reply. The
arguments I offered in §5 provide one. There I supposed that there are
such facts and argued that there are compelling moral reasons against
recovering and relying on them. My treatment of distributive and retributive justice—premised on what may seem the dubious supposition—is
not an alternative to Scheffler’s. Rather, it furnishes an argument on which
the holist needs to draw fully to answer those who think distributive justice must be responsive to desert.
Eric Nelson has offered an ingenious and creative argument for the
claim that Rawls’s asymmetric treatments of distributive and retributive
justice reveal a deep tension in his theory, a tension between two views
about what human agency can accomplish. He contends that the presence of those conflicting views is best explained by the lingering hold of
Rawls’s youthful anti-Pelagianism. The upshot of the reading of Rawls
I have offered is that there is no tension to be explained, and hence no
need to appeal to anti-Pelagianism to explain it. Rawls’s liberal egalitarianism, and that of the philosophers who have followed in his wake, does
not depend on an anti-Pelagian theology.
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Appendix: Numbered Propositions in Order of Their Introduction
(1) Citizens can earn or merit the fruits of their labor only if their “actions
and decisions in the realm of production can be attributed to [them] in the
morally relevant sense.”
(2) “the features of our person that cause us to be better or worse at producing value,” including “not only our degree of intelligence and our talents, but also (for some) our level of industriousness and commitment” are
“‘given’ from the outside, the products of some combination of heredity and
environment.”
(3) “we cannot be said to deserve, or be responsible for, the features of our
person that cause us to be better or worse at producing value.”
(4) “The fact that some citizens are more productive than others”—and so
the “actions and decisions [undertaken] in the realm of production”—are
“‘arbitrary from a moral point of view.’”
(5) “our actions and decisions in the realm of production cannot be attributed to us in the morally relevant sense.”
(6) “we cannot claim to have earned or merited the fruits of our labor.”
C: “the fruits of our labor” “should be distributed by the ‘basic structure of
society’ in an egalitarian fashion.”
(3.1) The features of persons that cause us to be better or worse at producing
value are given from the outside without regard to desert.
(3.2) If some features are given to us without regard to desert, then our possession of them is arbitrary from a moral point of view.
(3.3) Our possession of the features that make us better or worse at producing value is arbitrary from a moral point of view.
(3.4) If our possession of features is arbitrary from a moral point of view,
then so is our exercise of them.
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(2)’ “The extent to which natural capacities develop and reach fruition is
affected by all kinds of social conditions and class attitudes. Even the willingness to make an effort, to try, and so to be deserving in the ordinary sense
is itself dependent upon happy family and social circumstances.”
(3)’ No one deserves her place in the distributions of starting places, and of
raw or natural talents and abilities, which result from the natural lottery.
(4)’ The distribution of natural talents and abilities, and the social circumstances and chance contingencies that affect their development, are arbitrary
from a moral point of view.
(5)’ If a distributive system does not identify and nullify the effects of morally arbitrary conditions on the development and exercise of our productive
capacities, then under that system “our actions and decisions in the realm of
production cannot be attributed to us in the morally relevant sense.”
(5)’’ If a distributive system does not identify and nullify the effects of morally arbitrary conditions on the development and exercise of our productive
capacities, then under that system “our actions and decisions in the realm of
production” do not give rise to desert claims to shares of income and wealth.
(6)’ We cannot acquire desert claims to shares of income and wealth.
(7) A system of distribution is unjust if the distribution of undeserved shares
of income and wealth does not benefit the worst off.
(6NL)’ Under natural liberty, “we cannot claim to have earned or merited the
fruits of our labor.”
(6R)’ We cannot come to deserve punishment by performing “acts proscribed
by penal statutes.”
(2R)’ The extent to which a sense of justice develops and reaches fruition is
affected by all kinds of social conditions and class attitudes. Even the willingness to make an effort, to try to preserve and act on one’s sense of justice,
and so to refrain from “acts proscribed by penal statutes” is itself dependent
upon happy family and social circumstances.
(5R) “If a retributive system does not identify and nullify the effects of morally arbitrary conditions on the development and exercise of our sense of
justice, then under that system we cannot come to deserve punishment by
performing “acts proscribed by penal statutes.”

